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Abstract. We report the results of an agent-based model to study the
strategies that policy makers can apply to prevent the escalation of de-
viant behaviour in the aftermath of a disaster. Three policies are tested,
namely: a reinforcement of the police power; an increase of the infor-
mation available to the aﬀected population and a combination of both
policies. We test the eﬀect of time in the implementation of these policies.
The model shows that the policy which minimises deviant behaviour is
the mixed one applied early after the occurrence of a disaster. Therefore,
the outcome of this policy depends ultimately of the timing of their ap-
plication, which is consistent with what has been observed in some real
episodes.
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1 Introduction
Collective action tends to be adaptive after a disaster: most of the aﬀected res-
idents perform themselves many critical tasks, such as searching for and rescu-
ing victims. Both social cohesiveness and informal mechanisms of social control
increase during disasters, resulting actually in a lower incidence of deviant be-
haviour [1]. However, there are also documented cases where civil disturbances
escalate in the aftermath of a disaster [2]. From a policy viewpoint it is of
paramount importance to know why this escalation of violence might emerge
in the aftermath of a disaster and what steps can be taken to prevent it.
In Section 2 we put forward our assumptions. Then, in Section 3 the model
is presented. We evaluate the eﬀect of the proposed policies in Section 4. The
article finishes with some concluding remarks in Section 5.
2 Why can crime pay during disasters?
Assumption 1. Disasters increase the perceived benefits and decrease the per-
ceived costs individuals expect to obtain from their participation in looting. As
Becker’s [3] work demonstrates, when the marginal benefit of deviant behaviour
increases and the expected marginal cost falls, deviant behaviour escalates.
Firstly, disasters disrupt most of the facilities and communication systems. Pub-
lic institutions are seriously damaged and this reduces their response capability
and causes a decrease in the likelihood of being punished for deviant behaviour.
According to Congleton [4, p. 18], this was the case in New Orleans in 2005, after
the hurricane Katrina. Because much of the New Orleans’ police force had left
town during the emergency, “the probability of being punished for crimes such
as looting fell to nearly zero.” Secondly, disasters increase the benefit of partici-
pating in looting, because the available goods to satisfy basic needs are scarcer
and, consequently, more valuable. In the case of hurricane Katrina, Congleton
[4, p. 18] argued that “the marginal benefit of a bit of theft for honest folk who
had been forced out of their homes clearly increased.”
Assumption 2. Disasters reduce the amount and quality of the informa-
tion individuals perceive from their environment. Firstly, a disaster is a situation
that causes great distress, which can impair individuals’ decision making [5,6].
Secondly, a disaster might cut oﬀ all the communication systems individuals
use to be informed about their social environment (e.g., electronic broadcasting,
Internet, telephone). It has been established that failures of these technologies
increase the number of casualties and social costs [7]. This was observed after
the earthquake that struck Central Chile in February 2010, where all communi-
cation systems were cut oﬀ for up to one week [8]. Something totally diﬀerent
was observed in April 2009 after the earthquake that struck the Italian city of
L’Aquila: there, even mobile phones companies operated normally [9]. Looting
was observed in Central Chile, but not in L’Aquila.
This framework poses some interesting research questions. In this article, we
want to study the extent to which a delay in response from safety agencies can
favour looting behaviour or make more diﬃcult to thwart it. Empirical research
has documented that delays in help from public safety agencies, or misinformed
individuals, can trigger the escalation of looting [2]. The extensive looting re-
ported after hurricane Katrina in 2005 and in Central Chile after the earthquake
that struck this country in February 2010 can be explained, at least in part, by
the late reaction of safety agencies [10]. After the earthquake that struck L’Aquila
in 2009, safety agencies such as The Red Cross arrived to the aﬀected area a few
hours after the earthquake [11,12]. There was no reported looting in L’Aquila.
3 The simulation
We developed an agent-based model (ABM) to understand the escalation of de-
viant behaviour after a disaster strikes a population. Besides, we tested diﬀerent
policies in order to prevent or react to this escalation of crime. This model is an
extension of the ‘civil violence model’ developed by Epstein [13] and it was built
by considering the two assumptions we discussed in Section 2.
The artificial society is made of a square grid where agents are given the
ability to move on. The grid is made of 33 × 33 patches which can be of three
kinds:: resources, houses and streets. Resources resembles real-world places where
there are storage goods (e.g., shops, warehouses, silos). In our artificial society,
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each patch-resource stores unlimited goods; in case of a disaster, such amount of
goods becomes limited, arbitrarily set at 30 units. Houses are locations where a
single civilian agent is created and where she drops stolen goods. All the other
patches are streets, where all the agents are free to move. Houses, resources
and streets are randomly located over the grid according to an arbitrary density
(resource density = 5%, house density = 15%).
There are two types of agents: civilians (G) and police (D). Civilians have
four states: law-abiding (LA), agents that can move randomly on streets; hawks
(H), agents that are willing to steal goods, so if within their proximity there is
a resource, they move on to it and pick up a single good; stealers (B), agents
that hold a stolen good and head to their house; and caught (Z), agents that
are arrested by the police and sent into their house for an arbitrary amount of
time (10 simulation ticks). Police are agents in charge of arresting stealers (only
agents who are actually holding a stolen good can be arrested). Finally, agents
have a limited visibility radius expressed in terms of patches. v and v∗ are the
visibility radius for civilians and police respectively. Both are initially set equal
to 10 patches
The rule that governs the transition state of a civilian agent i is shown in
equation 1. This is a refinement of the one proposed by Epstein in his ‘civil
violence model’ [13].
[E (Ui)−Ni] > Ti Ti ∈ [0, 1] (1)
where,
E(Ui) = (1− pi) ·Mi − pi · Ci (2)
and
Ni =

Ri · pi R · p ￿= 0
− [1− E(U)] ·
￿
H
TOT
￿2
v
R · p = 0 (3)
Equation 1 compares the diﬀerence between the agent i’s expected util-
ity of looting and her net risk propensity with a non-negative threshold be-
tween 0 and 1, with that threshold randomly set across the civilians. Therefore,
we can state the simple local rule that governs the civilians’ state transition
as: if for a ‘law-abiding’ agent the diﬀerence E(Ui) − Ni exceeds Ti, then that
law-abiding agent becomes a Hawk and she starts to search for goods to steal;
otherwise, she remains as a law-abiding. On the other hand, if for an agent in
state ‘hawk’, the diﬀerence exceeds Ti, then that agent stays as hawk; otherwise,
she becomes law-abiding.
The agent’s expected utility of looting, equation 2, is the diﬀerence between
the agent i’s private benefit of looting Mi and the agent’s private cost of being
caught Ci, both arbitrarily initialised equal to 0.2.
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pi = 1− exp
￿
−k ·
￿
D
H
￿
v
￿
(4)
Equation 4 describes the agent’s estimated arrest probability pi, being set in
the same way as presented by Epstein [13]. This probability allows civilians to
be aware of other agents in their proximity, ultimately aﬀecting their states in
the next step of the simulation. D and H are the number of police and hawks
within the agent’s visibility radius respectively. However, this equation produces
a problem in our model. The limitation of computing pi as shown in equation 4 is
whenD = 0. In that case pi = 0, whereby the civilians would lose their awareness
of both the presence and the state of other civilians in their proximity, behaving
as atomistic agents. We overcame this weakness by equation 3. Ri is the agent
i’s risk aversion; in case that Ri · pi = 0 the net risk propensity Ni is a function
of the proportion of hawks (H) within the agent’s visibility radius and the total
number of civilians within the visibility radius (TOT ).
Equation 5 shows that, when S is equal to 1, a disaster has occurred, there-
fore, the private benefit of looting Mi increases as the total amount of resources
Q decreases; Jt is the actual amount of resources available at time t. For simplic-
ity we assume a linear relationship between Mi and Q, and that all the civilians
are aware of the amount of resources left.
Mi =

Mi S = 0
Mi(t) = 1−
￿
(1−Mi)
Q
· Jt
￿
S = 1
(5)
Finally, equation 6 expresses the eﬀect of the magnitude of a disaster MD
(which it ranges between 0 and 10 in our simulation) on both civilians’ and
police’ visibility. Thus,
v(∗) =
￿
10 S = 0
10−MD S = 1 (6)
Police agents are much simpler than prospective looters and stealers. Police
move randomly on the grid; if within its visibility radius v∗ there is one or more
civilians in state stealer (B), the police captures one stealer, returns the good
to a resource chosen at random and the civilian is sent into her house where she
stays for 10 simulation ticks.
Figure 1 shows the results of implementing the previous specifications in our
artificial society. Figure 1a shows the artificial society in ordinary conditions,
with no disaster, where there are few hawks and occasional stealers and resources
are constant. These situations change dramatically when a disaster strikes the
population. Figure 1b shows that, when a disaster strikes, we observe a sharp
increase in the proportion of hawks and stealers, being just few of the latter
caught (the eﬀectiveness of police is low given the dramatic drop in their visibility
v∗ caused by the disaster). The increase in the proportion of hawks is mainly
driven by the sudden decrease of available resources.
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(a) No Earthquake
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(b) Earthquake
black = Hawks; red = Caught; green = Stealers; blue = Resources.
Fig. 1: Earthquake eﬀects
4 Testing policies: results and analysis
By following our research topic presented in Section 2, we test three diﬀerent
policies, namely: a reinforcement of the police power (Police Intervention); an
increase of the information available to the aﬀected population (Social Policy)
and, finally, a combination of both policies (Joint Policy). We used the artificial
society presented above to study the eﬀect of these policies.
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(a) Late Intervention
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(b) Early Intervention
black = Hawks; red = Caught; green = Stealers; blue = Resources.
Fig. 2: Police intervention
The experimental set consists of six simulations. Disasters always strike after
50 simulation ticks and policies are implemented either at 100 ticks (early inter-
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vention) or at 350 ticks (late intervention). When the disaster strikes, resources
become limited, so there will be no goods supply thereafter. Furthermore, both
civilians’ and police’s visibility drop from 10 to 2 patches. Police intervention
was implemented in the model by increasing the police agents’ visibility v∗ to 10
patches; the Social Policy by increasing the civilians’ v to 10 patches; the Joint
Policy is a combination of the previous two policies. Results are shown by plots
which illustrates the proportion of hawks, stealers, caught agents and resources
available over time.
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(a) Late Social Policy
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(b) Early Social Policy
black = Hawks; red = Caught; green = Stealers; blue = Resources.
Fig. 3: Social Policy
Figure 2a illustrates the eﬀect of a late Police Intervention. This intervention
seems to protect the resources eﬃciently as well as dropping the proportion of
stealers dramatically. However, this intervention does not decrease the propor-
tion of hawks. An early Police Intervention, as shown in Figure 2b, would bring
about the same eﬀect except that, since it is applied earlier, will impede a sharp
decrease of resources and consequently solely few hawks are observed. A late
social policy, as shown in Figure 3a, causes a sudden drop of hawks but it can
not maintain the artificial society stable and fluctuations in the proportion of
hawks are observed over time. Moreover, it aﬀects the decrease of resources sen-
sibly, but does not maintain them constant. Just an early social policy, Figure
3b, will both maintain the society stable and bring about a moderate decrease
of resources.
The joint eﬀect of the two policies tested in this article results the best policy
to apply after a disaster. A late social and joint intervention will preserve the
current amount of resources as well as drop the proportion of stealers, however
it generates wide fluctuation of the proportion of hawks over time. Figure 4b
shows the best intervention policy observed in our experimental set. An early
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(a) Late Joint Policy
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(b) Early Joint Policy
black = Hawks; red = Caught; green = Stealers; blue = Resources.
Fig. 4: Social Policy and Police Intervention
joint intervention seems to protect the current amount of resources eﬃciently as
well as to maintain ordinary behavior in society.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have reported the results of an ABM to study the emergence of
looting behaviour after the occurrence of a disaster. The model suggests that, in
absence of any external policy, a disaster triggers a deviant behaviour escalation
in the system.
We analysed also the impact of three diﬀerent policies that can be imple-
mented by government agencies: an increase of the police power, an increase of
the information available to the aﬀected population and, finally, a combination
of both policies. Additionally, we test the eﬀect of time in the implementation of
these policies. The results indicate that an early joint intervention successfully
contains the escalation of deviant behavior. Late interventions are not able to re-
store the artificial society to its initial ordinary state. Moreover, the intervention
policies taken into account seem to aﬀect two diﬀerent aspects of the artificial
society. Whilst applying a social policy would bring about an overall decrease
of hawks, a police intervention would eﬃciently protect the resources available.
Therefore, the outcome of those policies depends ultimately upon the timing
of their application. Thus, a mixed policy of reinforcement of police forces and
a recovery of the communication systems that allows people to be informed of
their environment early after a disaster strikes a population might prevent or
thwart the escalation of looting behaviour.
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